This study aims to examine the ethical decision-making model proposed by Schwartz, where we consider the factors of non-rationality and aspects that affect ethical judgments of auditors to make the decision to blow the whistle. In this paper, we argue that the intention of whistleblowing depends on ethical awareness and ethical judgment as well as there is a mediation–moderation due to emotion and perceived moral intensity of auditors. Data were collected using an online survey with 162 external auditors who worked (...) on audit firms in Indonesia as well as 173 internal auditors working in the manufacturing and financial services. The result of multigroup analysis shows that emotion can mediate the relationship between EAW and EJW. The nature of this relationship is more complex and then tested by adding moderating variables using consistent partial least squares approach. We found that EMT and PMI can improve the relationship between ethical judgments and whistleblowing intentions. These findings indicate that internal auditors are more likely to blow the whistle than external auditors; and reporting wrongdoing internally and anonymously are the preferred way of professional accountants to blow the whistle in Indonesia. (shrink)

This work empirically tests the concept of the ‘whistleblowing triangle,’ which is modeled on the three factors encapsulated by the fraud triangle (pressure or financial incentives, opportunity and rationalization), in the Indonesian context. Anchored in the proposition of an original research framework on the whistleblowing triangle and derived hypotheses, this work aims to expand the body of knowledge on this topic by providing empirical evidence. The sample used is taken from audit firms affiliated with both the big 4 and non-big (...) 4 companies operating in Indonesia. The results of analysis using the PLS-PM method found a significant relationship between the components of the whistleblowing triangle and the intention of blowing the whistle. We found that financial incentives are the most significant predictor of auditors’ intention to blow the whistle in Indonesia. Other components, such as opportunity and rationalization, also play an important role in supporting auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Our findings also suggest that related pressures are the top priority for audit firms in Indonesia to consider in increasing whistleblowing intention. We expand the previous literature on whistleblowing which has been derived from the components of the fraud triangle (Brown et al. in Account Public Interest 16(1):28–56, 2016; Smaili and Arroyo in J Bus Ethics, 10.1007/s10551-017-3663-7, 2017) by adding empirical evidence. (shrink)

Este artigo visa analisar a narrativa (auto)biográfica de estudantes de Pedagogia em uma universidade pública da região do Vale do São Francisco, localizada no território de Petrolina-PE em contexto de pandemia da COVID-19. Para refletir sobre a formação a partir da escrita de si, pautamo-nos, teórica e metodologicamente, em Heidegger, Josso, Freire, Ribeiro, Passeggi, Sousa e Lima. Neste artigo, comtempla-se respostas referentes à como os estudantes se sentiram no processo de formação docente em meio a pandemia e o que (...) esperavam do futuro. A turma do curso de Pedagogia era composta por 19 estudantes, deste total, 17 participaram da atividade da escrita da carta a si. Como estratégia de análise, utilizou-se o método do círculo hermenêutico “heideggeriano”. Assim, as informações foram organizadas em três temas de sentido, sendo: saúde mental na pandemia; ensino remoto versus ensino presencial; e planejamento de carreira. Percebeu-se, por meio das cartas, a preocupação quanto ao ensino remoto, assim como os planos de futuro, com intenção contribuir socialmente para uma educação humana e facilitadora de aprendizagens. Notou-se, ainda, que os estudantes refletiram sobre o bem-estar na profissão, buscando o sentido de suas ações, além de demarcarem o suporte financeiro, emocional, familiar e formativo. (shrink)

The main objective of our research is to analyze the correlation between the struggle for recognition, the National Truth Commission – CNV and collective memory. To achieve our goal, we propose to analyze memory from collective and social struggles evoking collective memory within an intersubjective relationship that involves disputes, negotiations, manipulations and forgetting. It is important to emphasize that the theoretical framework of our work is supported by the debate around the struggles for recognition. Therefore, we will verify, from Axel (...) Honneth, the moral grammar of the struggles around this reciprocal recognition and how this dynamic happens in current social practices and, ipso facto, we intend to articulate the discussion of the communication paradigm with collective memory. (shrink)

In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

O presente trabalho pretende resgatar o debate entre Richard Rorty e Nancy Fraser, ocorrido no início da década de 1990, especificamente a partir do texto Feminismo e Pragmatismo apresentado na Tanner Lectures on Human Value. Nesta conferência o filósofo discorreu sobre a possibilidade de conciliação entre o seu pragmatismo e o feminismo. Rorty aborda o feminismo enquanto autocriação da mulher através da “redescrição” mediante a manifestação poética, onde o filósofo encara as feministas como criadoras do novo. Em seguida, exporemos a (...) crítica de Fraser, que trabalha sobre a proposta apresentada pelo pragmatista e que oferece suas próprias ideias dentro de uma concepção do feminismo como movimento democrático de massa. Ao final, uma breve avaliação das implicações das críticas e sugestões apresentadas por Rorty ao feminismo e também da resposta de Fraser. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multi-dimensional and relative to human realities. The "axiological" position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed 'natural' relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most 'natural' in that sense is (...) always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the Problem of Natural Kinds' sits otiose. (shrink)

This paper is a research study of an interdisciplinary and exploratory kind drawing on a case study undertaken in elementary classrooms in socio-economically disadvantaged areas of Santiago de Chile. Having combined Linguistics for Education Studies and Corpus Linguistics approaches, the analysis of pragmalinguistic choices (i.e. personal pronouns, other lexical choices marking in-group relations) used in the introductory parts in a corpus of 50 lessons recorded in an elementary school setting there comes to be a key strategy for teachers' and learners' (...) involvement in classroom interaction The pragmalinguistic strategies evidenced in teachers' and learners' output have come to confirm the role of communicative strategies to promote participants' engagement in the teaching/learning process. In other words, teachers create an in-group relation, a solid sense of belonging and empathy among the participants in the teaching-learning context from the opening communicative stances in use to overcome less advantaged home and community cultural settings. The research findings also point to further studies to devise pedagogic tools addressing the specific contexts under scrutiny. Thus, a Teacher-Learner rapport is conveyed primarily through teachers' language choice, which is seen as the main force for learners' engagement in disadvantaged settings. (shrink)

Do we love someone for their virtue, their beauty, or their moral or other qualities? Are love's characteristic desires altruistic or selfish? Are there duties of love? What do the sciences tell us about love? In this Very Short Introduction, Ronald de Sousa explores the different kinds of love, from affections to romantic love.

In a world of appalling social inequalities people are becoming more aware of the multiple dimensions of injustice, whether social, political, cultural, sexual, ethnic, religious, historical, or ecological. Rarely acknowledged is another vital dimension: cognitive injustice, the failure to recognize the different ways of knowing by which people across the globe run their lives and provide meaning to their existence. This book shows why cognitive injustice underlies all the other dimensions; global social justice is not possible without global cognitive justice. (...) Santos s argument unfolds in two inquiries. No matter how internally diverse, Western Modernity provided the knowledge underlying the long cycle of colonialism followed by global capitalism. These historical processes profoundly devalued and marginalized the knowledge and wisdom that had been in existence in the global South. Today, working against epistemicide is imperative in order to recover and valorize the epistemological diversity of the world. Such recovery and valorization is the book s second inquiry and is based on four key analytical tools: sociology of absences, sociology of emergences, ecology of knowledges, and intercultural translation. The transformation of the world s epistemological diversity into an empowering instrument against hegemonic globalization points to a new kind of bottom-up cosmopolitanism. It would promote a wide conversation of humankind, celebrating conviviality, solidarity, and life against the logic of market-ridden greed and individualism and the destruction of life to which world populations large and small are condemned by the dominant forces of globalization. --Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Femininity and whiteness dominate Western nursing, silencing ontologies and epistemologies that do not align with these dominant norms while perpetuating systemic racism and discrimination in nursing practice, education, research, nursing activism, and sociopolitical structures. We propose Black feminist thought as a praxis to decenter, deconstruct, and unseat these ideologies and systems of power. Drawing from the work of past and present Black feminist scholars, we examine the ontological and epistemological perspectives of Black feminist thought. These include (i) the uniqueness and (...) particular experiences of people, (ii) the acceptance of ontological and epistemological pluralism of truths and ways of knowing, and (iii) the mandate for equity in the health, social, political, and environmental structures of society. By focusing our attention on lived experiences and voices of those systematically excluded in nursing practice, education, research, and society, Black feminist thought offers an anticolonial, antiracist, and antidiscriminatory foundation for more effectively upholding nursing's disciplinary mandate for social justice and equity. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

A kind of “ruthless reductionism” characterized the experimental practices of the first two decades of molecular and cellular cognition. More recently, new research tools have expanded experimental practices in this field, enabling researchers to image and manipulate individual molecular mechanisms in behaving organisms with an unprecedented temporal, sub-cellular, cellular, and even circuit-wide specificity. These tools dramatically expand the range and reach of experiments in MCC, and in doing so they may help us transcend the worn-out and counterproductive debates about “reductionism” (...) and “emergence” that divide neuroscientists and philosophers alike. We describe examples of these new tools and illustrate their practical power by presenting an exemplary recent case of MCC research using them. From these tools and results, we provide an initial sketch of a new image of the behaving organism in its full causal-interactive complexity, with its molecules, cells, and circuits combined within the single system that it is. This new image stands in opposition to the traditional “levels” image of the behaving organism, and even the initial sketch we provide of it here offers hope for avoiding the dreary metaphysical debates about “emergence” and “downward causation,” and even the reduction vs. anti-reduction dispute, all dependent upon the familiar “levels” image. (shrink)

Nothing seems to follow strictly from 'X believes that p'. But if we reinterpret it to mean: 'X can consistently be described as consistently believing p'--which roughly renders, I think, Hintikka's notion of "defensibility"--we can get on with the subject, freed from the inhibitions of descriptive adequacy. But defensibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth: it tells us little, therefore, about the concept of belief on which it is based. It cannot, in particular, specify necessary conditions for the consistent (...) ascription of belief--as opposed to rational belief. If there are no such conditions, all belief ascriptions must be treated as atomic: which is implausible. If there are some, they must be settled on before an account of consistency can be complete. The reason is simple: it is that we have beliefs about our own beliefs. A set of first order beliefs is consistent if they can all be true together; but it is a lesson of Moore's paradox that consistency of second-order beliefs requires additional constraints. If someone both believes that p and that he does not believe that p, the propositions he believes might all be true together, yet he is inconsistent. And the characterization of second order consistency will remain incomplete, so long as nothing is said about the consistency of first order belief ascriptions. Suppose someone says and believes: "I am inconsistent: I believe both p and ~p." This is "indefensible": but is it insight, or nonsense? Breast-beating of this sort is guaranteed success: something he believes is bound to be false. But that remains diagnostically frustrating: is he inconsistent because what he said is true, or on the contrary because it is inconsistent? (shrink)

High and low alexithymia scorers were confronted with a modified visual oddball task that allowed the study of categorical perception of emotional expressions on faces. Participants had to quickly detect a deviant (rare) morphed face that shared or did not share the same emotional expression as the frequent one. Expected categorical perception effects, which were also neurophysiologically indexed, showed that rare stimuli were detected faster if they depicted a different emotional expression compared to rare stimuli depicting the same emotional expression (...) than the frequent one. Even if no differences were observed at a behavioural level, high alexithymia scorers evidenced overall delayed neurophysiological responses in components related to the attentional processing of rare emotional faces. Moreover, the categorical perception effects for event-related components associated with the attentional processing were smaller in high alexithymia scorers and were even absent for anger. These results show that high alexithymia scorers present discrimination delays that are already observed at the attentional level. (shrink)

O artigo constitui-se de uma apresentação sucinta dos elementos principais do sistema ético de Max Scheler. Utilizando-se do método fenomenológico, Scheler afirma que a ética deve basear-se na experiência, pois o valor não é algo que se atribui, mas que é experimentado. O fenomenólogo alemão defende que o homem está rodeado por um cosmos de valores que não necessita ser produzido, apenas reconhecido através do perceber sentimental, possibilitando, inclusive, uma organização hierárquica dos valores. No entanto, este perceber se encontra afetado (...) pelo ressentimento, o que implica em uma negação dos valores através da inversão valorativa. (shrink)

La parentalité impose au sujet un travail psychique intense qui s’appuie sur des aspects narcissiques, archaïques, sur l’histoire de la filiation et de la transmission psychique. La parentalité est, avant tout, liée à un processus qui comporte des risques psychiques particuliers face aux événements de vie. Identifier ces enjeux dans la relation parent-enfant et comprendre ce qui est sollicité pour le sujet face à des événements nécessite de remodeler les alliances et de trouver un nouvel équilibre psychique. Dans le cadre (...) d’une recherche clinique, les auteures, impliquées dans un dispositif d’écoute psychanalytique de la parentalité, proposent une discussion quant aux repères cliniques des enjeux qui sous-tendent la relation parent-enfant. Ce questionnement est discuté par deux vignettes cliniques, celle de Maria qui, après son accouchement, expérimente des vécus corporels primitifs projetés sur son bébé et celle de Camila, qui commence son analyse après la tentative de suicide de sa fille. Dans l’ensemble de ces vignettes, on observe une réorganisation de la dynamique psychique et une possibilité de symboliser davantage les modes d’alliance de la dyade parent-enfant. (shrink)

Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the (...) difference? We need to distinguish the criteria of correspondence or appropriateness suitable for authenticity from those that embody the criterion of truth. Furthermore there is also a question about the transitions – among states of mind, and between states of mind and behaviour – that emotions encourage. This realm of transitions concerns rationality. After sketching the relevant distinctions, I will endeavour to justify the view that emotions should be appraised in terms of all three terms. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta as principais distinções feitas por Arendt em torno do seu conceito de ação, assim como debate as críticas a respeito da irrelevância do conceito de ação, e seu distanciamento da política real. As críticas ao conceito de ação política debatidas no artigo partiram de Jürgen Habermas e Martin Jay. O primeiro acusa Arendt de equiparar a ação estratégica à instrumental, e, portanto, situá-la fora do âmbito político, o segundo autor vai mais longe e acusa Arendt de (...) elaborar uma concepção tão heroica de ação que compartilharia uma das faces mais sinistras do totalitarismo, sua indiferença para com considerações utilitárias. Porém, tais interpretações não condizem com os textos de Arendt. Neles, ela não descarta elementos de intencionalidade e causalidade presentes em qualquer ação humana. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

Does avoiding biased responding to reasoning problems and grasping the ­correct solution require engaging in effortful deliberation or can such solution insight be acquired more intuitively? In this study we set out to test the impact of deliberation on the efficiency of a de-bias training in which the problem logic was explained to participants. We focused on the infamous bat-and-ball problem and varied the degree of possible deliberation during the training session by manipulating time constraints and cognitive load. The results (...) show that the less constrained the deliberation, the more participants improve. However, even under extremely stringent conditions (high time-pressure and dual task load), participants still show a significant improvement. Critically, this “intuitive” insight effect persists over two months. This suggests that deliberation helps reasoners benefit from the training, but it is not indispensable. We discuss critical applied and theoretical implications. (shrink)

ENTREVISTA COM PROFESSORAS(ES) DE FILOSOFIA DO ENSINO MÉDIO DO CEARÁ – BLOCO IICom: Dayane Evellin de Sousa Costa, Emilson Silva LopesPor: Antônio Alex Pereira de Sousa, Paulo Willame Araújo de Lima.

Exploring the struggles against moral and cultural imperialism.

Un discurso sobre las ciencias -- Hacia una epistemología de la ceguera : por qué razón las nuevas formas de "adecuación ceremonial" no regulan ni emancipan? -- Hacia una sociología de las ausencias y una sociología de las emergencias -- Más allá del pensamiento abismal : de las líneas globales a una ecología de saberes -- El fin de los descubrimientos imperiales -- Nuestra América : reinventando un paradigma subalterno de reconocimiento y redistribución -- Entre Próspero y Caliban : colonialismo, (...) poscolonialismo e inter-identidad -- De lo posmoderno a lo poscolonial y más allá de uno y de otro. (shrink)

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed ‘natural’ relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most ‘natural’ in that sense is (...) always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the ‘Problem of Natural Kinds’ sits otiose. (shrink)